This page provides neutral information on the legal situation. As chair of a conciliation committee I represent neither side – I guide employer and works council jointly to a balanced, legally sound arrangement.
LAG Schleswig-Holstein · 2nd Chamber
Whistleblower reporting office: outsourcing to a law firm does not remove co-determination
Order of 8 July 2025 · Ref. 2 TaBV 16/24 · Section 87(1) no. 1 BetrVG, Sections 12, 14, 17 HinSchG (Whistleblower Protection Act)
Key point: An employer with around 230 employees had set up its internal reporting office under the Whistleblower Protection Act at a law firm already working for it, without involving the works council, and had informed staff by notice of the reporting channel (an e-mail address), the expected content and the handling of reports. The Regional Labour Court upheld the works council's injunction claim: whether a reporting office is set up is prescribed by statute and therefore not subject to co-determination, nor is the organisational decision to outsource it to a third party. How it operates – reporting channels, anonymity, procedure and follow-up measures – concerns the conduct of employees in the establishment and remains subject to co-determination under Section 87(1) no. 1 BetrVG even when the office is run externally; the employer must secure the works council's rights through its contract with the provider (lower instance: Labour Court Elmshorn, 3 BV 2 a/24; final according to the state portal).
Relevance in practice: In the underlying case a conciliation committee on the reporting office had already been appointed but was dormant – the injunction gives the works council considerable weight there. For chairpersons this means the subject matter to be regulated is the reporting regime, not the choice of provider; a ruling should therefore specify reporting channels, anonymity, response times and the obligations of the external operator.
Source: gesetze-rechtsprechung.sh.juris.de (Schleswig-Holstein case law portal) →
LAG Rhineland-Palatinate · 3rd Chamber
Cross-site teams: working time is a matter for the central works council
Order of 4 February 2026 · Ref. 3 TaBV 21/24 · Section 50(1) sentence 1, Section 87(1) nos. 2 and 3 BetrVG
Key point: A conciliation committee appointed by the court on working time and overtime had declared itself not competent; the works council of a small site (around 20 employees) then sought a declaration that it holds the co-determination right under Section 87(1) nos. 2 and 3 BetrVG. The Regional Labour Court rejected this, at least for employees working in cross-site teams with the company's second establishment. A compelling need for a cross-establishment arrangement (Section 50(1) BetrVG) does not require a "technically intolerable disruption"; a technical and organisational interlinking of work processes is enough, where the scheduling of working time and overtime affects team members at both sites alike – competence then lies with the central works council (lower instance: Labour Court Mainz, 8 BV 24/24; further appeal not admitted, final).
Relevance in practice: Where teams work across sites, the question of competence should be settled before the conciliation committee is set up – otherwise, as here, a ruling of non-competence may follow months of proceedings. For chairpersons, the decision confirms that the organisational structure of the work, not merely the employer's wish for uniformity, determines the level of negotiation.
Source: landesrecht.rlp.de (Rhineland-Palatinate case law portal) →
Hessian Regional Labour Court · 16th Appeal Chamber
Duty rosters submitted late: declaratory relief, not an injunction
Order of 26 May 2025 · Ref. 16 TaBV 133/24 · Section 77(1) BetrVG; Section 256(1) ZPO
Key point: A works agreement on working time obliged the employer to submit a written draft duty roster for each calendar month to the works council for approval at least two months before it took effect; in five months of 2024 it failed to do so. The Hessian Regional Labour Court upheld the obligation but corrected the form of the application: an injunction only preserves the existing state of affairs under works constitution law – it does not fit where the employer is to be required to take a particular action. An application for performance, in turn, would be inadmissible because the claim to future rosters has not yet arisen. The only viable route is a declaratory application under Section 256(1) ZPO, based on the duty to implement the works agreement under Section 77(1) BetrVG. The interest in a declaration did not lapse because the employer had replaced the unit manager and did not dispute the duty; the former manager's absence provided no excuse, since the works council had repeatedly reminded his superior as well (lower instance: Labour Court Frankfurt am Main, 2 BV 92/24; further appeal not admitted).
Relevance in practice: Deadlines in a works agreement are enforceable – but only with the right application: where recurring duties for future periods are at stake, a declaration is the appropriate remedy, not an injunction backed by a penalty. For conciliation committees this is a useful pointer: submission deadlines should be drafted so that delays are measured against a clear, judicially reviewable standard.
Source: lareda.hessenrecht.hessen.de (Hessian case law portal) →
LAG Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania · 5th Chamber
Pay structure: no external expert as negotiator for the works council
Order of 25 November 2025 · Ref. 5 TaBV 2/25 · Section 80(2) and (3), Section 87(1) no. 10 BetrVG
Key point: Having broken off talks on a new pay system, a works council wanted an external adviser to draft its own pay structure and sought to have the employer’s consent under Section 80(3) BetrVG replaced by the court. The regional labour court dismissed the appeal: external expertise is necessary only where the works council lacks the specialist or legal knowledge for a specific task and cannot obtain it more cheaply – in particular from within the company. An expert is there to advise the works council, not to negotiate with the employer as its representative. The works council can assess role profiles and job requirements from its own knowledge of the workplace, and it had not identified any specific open questions (lower instance: Labour Court Rostock, 2 BV 10/24, upheld; further appeal not admitted).
Relevance in practice: The right of initiative under Section 87(1) no. 10 BetrVG covers the works council’s own proposals on pay structure, but not a counter-draft at the employer’s expense. A works council that needs expertise should spell out its open questions and use internal sources first – and if no agreement is reached, the conciliation committee is where the pay system gets decided.
Source: Landesrecht Mecklenburg-Vorpommern →
LAG Cologne · 9th Chamber
Retrospective leave for a single employee: no case for a conciliation committee
Order of 24 November 2025 · Ref. 9 TaBV 36/25 · Section 100(1) sent. 2 ArbGG; Section 87(1) no. 5 BetrVG
Key point: A works council sought a conciliation committee on one employee’s retrospectively refused holiday request; the regional labour court held the committee to be manifestly without jurisdiction. Section 87(1) no. 5 BetrVG serves to reconcile the holiday wishes of several employees with one another and with operational needs – that collective dimension is absent where all that remains is to decide after the event whether past absences should count as leave; the second limb of the provision (fixing the timing of leave for individual employees) likewise requires that several employees be jointly affected. The works agreement on holiday planning, which expressly allowed either side to call the committee where a holiday request was refused, did not help either, since it too presupposes a weighing of collective interests that is still possible. Finally, the labour court was not entitled to recast the subject matter as general “conflict resolution”: the applicant must define it with sufficient precision – even for a voluntary committee – and may not leave that definition to the committee itself (lower instance: Labour Court Bonn, 6 BV 95/25).
Relevance in practice: Two lessons for the conduct of proceedings: a closed individual case is no vehicle for a conciliation committee, and the subject matter belongs precisely in the application. Widening it into an open “conflict resolution” invites rejection – and pay deductions or written warnings are outside the committee’s reach in any event.
Source: nrwe.justiz.nrw.de →
LAG Rhineland-Palatinate · 6th Chamber
Above-tariff allowances: "purely individual deals" does not block the conciliation committee
Decision of 2 December 2025 · case no. 6 TaBV 7/25 · § 100(1) sent. 2 ArbGG; § 74(1), § 87(1) nos. 10 and 11 BetrVG
Key finding: Where an employer bound by a collective agreement pays above-tariff allowances to roughly 15% of the workforce – almost exclusively managers – a conciliation committee on company pay structures is not manifestly without jurisdiction. The objection that every allowance rests on a purely individual decision must be substantiated case by case; a blanket assertion is not enough – all the more so because the reasons the employer itself gave (attracting applicants, retaining employees minded to leave, protecting pay after a downward transfer) point to abstract, general criteria and therefore to a collective set of facts. The subject matter may be framed broadly; in the appointment proceedings the works council need not state the content of the arrangement it seeks. The duty to negotiate first was also met – the written refusal to accept any co-determination right entitled the works council to treat negotiations as having failed – and jurisdiction of the central works council was not manifest precisely because the employer denied that any general arrangement existed (lower instance: Labour Court Koblenz, 4 BV 5/25).
Practical relevance: An employer seeking to fend off the appointment with "nothing but individual arrangements" must set out, for each case, the particular circumstances and the absence of any inner link to other employees; blanket submissions regularly lead to the committee being established, since the real examination of jurisdiction is for the committee itself. A side note worth keeping: the court corrected the chairman's misstated official title in the operative part – a reason to name the desired chair carefully in the application.
Source: landesrecht.rlp.de (Rhineland-Palatinate state law portal) →
LAG Düsseldorf · 12th Chamber
Mobile work: the employer determines the level of co-determination
Order of 21 January 2026 · Ref. 12 TaBV 66/25 · Section 100 ArbGG; Section 87(1) no. 14, Section 50 BetrVG
Key point: Where models of mobile work are offered uniformly across the company, the central works council is not manifestly without jurisdiction; the conciliation committee is established at that level. Because mobile work is a partially co-determined matter – the employer decides freely on the "whether", only the "how" is co-determined – the employer's choice of a company-wide arrangement also determines the level of co-determination and thus the competent body. The arrangement is a single subject matter and may not be split across several levels; individual home-office agreements already concluded do not create jurisdiction for the local works councils. The court raised the number of assessors to three per side (lower instance: Labour Court Düsseldorf, 15 BV 172/25).
Relevance in practice: An employer who offers mobile work uniformly across the company must also negotiate at company level – the objection "that is for the local works councils" will usually fail. For the conduct of the proceedings: settle the level of jurisdiction early and do not artificially divide the subject matter.
Source: nrwe.justiz.nrw.de →
LAG Cologne · 9th Chamber
No jurisdiction over the place fixing start and end of working time
Order of 1 July 2025 · Ref. 9 TaBV 25/25 · Section 87(1) no. 2 BetrVG; Section 100 ArbGG
Key point: The conciliation committee is manifestly not competent to determine the place whose reaching or leaving marks the start and end of working time. That is not a co-determined regulatory question but a legal question of interpreting existing contractual or collective rules (dispute over travel time from a car park relocated during construction work).
Relevance in practice: The decision marks the limit of Section 87(1) no. 2 BetrVG: the position and distribution of working time are co-determined, but treating the commute as working time is not. For the appointment of a committee (Section 100 ArbGG) this is the decisive test.
Source: nrwe.justiz.nrw.de →
BAG · 1st Senate
An opening clause creates no enforceable co-determination right
Order of 23 September 2025 · Ref. 1 ABR 20/24 · Sections 76(5), 87(1) no. 5, 77(3) BetrVG
Key point: A committee award (here on additional leave for long-serving staff) is void where its collective basis is only an opening clause under Section 77(3) sentence 2 BetrVG allowing merely voluntary works agreements. Such a clause creates no enforceable co-determination right – the committee cannot decide unilaterally under Section 76(5) BetrVG.
Relevance in practice: Before any procedure it must be clarified whether a matter is subject to enforceable co-determination (Section 87) or only to a voluntary arrangement. That distinction governs both jurisdiction and the validity of the award.
Source: bundesarbeitsgericht.de →
BAG · 1st Senate
Health protection: co-determination attaches to actual hazards
Order of 28 March 2017 · Ref. 1 ABR 25/15 · Section 87(1) no. 7 BetrVG; Sections 3, 5 ArbSchG
Key point: Co-determination under Section 87(1) no. 7 BetrVG together with Section 3(1) ArbSchG attaches to the existence of hazards that are either established or are to be determined through a risk assessment under Section 5 ArbSchG. The open-ended safety standard must be sufficiently concrete for a co-determined rule to be adopted.
Relevance in practice: Before a health-protection rule the hazard situation must be clarified – the risk assessment is both the anchor and the limit of co-determination.
Source: bundesarbeitsgericht.de →
BAG · 1st Senate
No provisional shift plan without consent via a committee award
Order of 9 July 2013 · Ref. 1 ABR 19/12 · Section 87(1) nos. 2, 3, (2) BetrVG; Section 76(2) BetrVG
Key point: A conciliation-committee award may not authorise the employer to implement a shift plan provisionally, without the works council's consent, until the committee decides. Co-determination over the position and distribution of working time (Section 87(1) nos. 2 and 3 BetrVG) persists even in urgent cases; a blanket provisional implementation power is impermissible.
Relevance in practice: Short-notice duty and shift changes need co-determined procedural rules – the employer cannot reserve unilateral implementation by award.
Source: bundesarbeitsgericht.de →
BAG · 1st Senate
Working-time recording: no works-council initiative right
Order of 13 September 2022 · Ref. 1 ABR 22/21 · Section 87(1) BetrVG; Section 3(2) no. 1 ArbSchG
Key point: Employers are already required by law to record the start and end of daily working time (Section 3(2) no. 1 ArbSchG). The works council therefore has no initiative right, enforceable by a committee award, to compel the introduction of an electronic time-recording system – the “whether” is prescribed by statute.
Relevance in practice: A landmark decision (the “time-clock” ruling); co-determination remains for the “how” of the arrangement, not the statutorily required “whether”.
Source: bundesarbeitsgericht.de →
BAG · 1st Senate
Headset system as a monitoring-capable device (Section 87 no. 6)
Order of 16 July 2024 · Ref. 1 ABR 16/23 · Section 87(1) no. 6, Section 50 BetrVG
Key point: A headset system that lets supervisors listen in on employees' communication is a device capable of monitoring and is subject to co-determination under Section 87(1) no. 6 BetrVG – even without recording or storage. What matters is the objective capability to monitor. Where introduced company-wide, the group works council is competent.
Relevance in practice: Confirms the broad reach of Section 87(1) no. 6 BetrVG for modern (real-time) systems – the mere capability triggers co-determination.
Source: bundesarbeitsgericht.de →
BAG · 1st Senate
Pay principles: excluding a group from a pay increase
Order of 21 February 2017 · Ref. 1 ABR 12/15 · Section 87(1) no. 10 BetrVG
Key point: If the employer excludes employees of certain business areas from a general pay increase, it changes the pay principles applying in the establishment – this is subject to co-determination under Section 87(1) no. 10 BetrVG. The employer may not unilaterally define the circle of benefiting employees.
Relevance in practice: Even deciding WHO receives a pay rise is a co-determined distribution principle – a frequent point of dispute in pay committees.
Source: bundesarbeitsgericht.de →
BAG · 1st Senate
Video surveillance: limits of a committee award (Section 87 no. 6)
Order of 11 December 2012 · Ref. 1 ABR 78/11 · Section 87(1) no. 6 BetrVG
Key point: Video surveillance is subject to co-determination under Section 87(1) no. 6 BetrVG. A committee award is nonetheless void if it disproportionately restricts the access options opened up by statute or official order. Where an administrative act obliges the employer to a specific measure, co-determination is limited accordingly.
Relevance in practice: Shows the limits of the co-determined design of video surveillance – statutory/official requirements prevail and the award must remain proportionate.
Source: bundesarbeitsgericht.de →
BAG · 1st Senate
Ban on private phone use: no co-determination (work conduct)
Order of 17 October 2023 · Ref. 1 ABR 24/22 · Section 87(1) no. 1 BetrVG
Key point: Where the employer bans private mobile-phone use during working time to ensure proper performance of work, the works council has no co-determination right under Section 87(1) no. 1 BetrVG. Such a ban concerns co-determination-free work conduct, not the co-determined order of the establishment (shaping the collective community).
Relevance in practice: Sharpens the key distinction between order-of-conduct and work conduct – decisive for phone/usage bans and conduct rules.
Source: bundesarbeitsgericht.de →
BAG · 1st Senate
Tolerating overtime breaches co-determination (Section 87 no. 3)
Order of 28 July 2020 · Ref. 1 ABR 18/19 · Section 87(1) no. 3, Section 23(3) BetrVG
Key point: Co-determination under Section 87(1) no. 3 BetrVG is breached not only by actively ordering but also by merely tolerating overtime. Such toleration exists where there are sufficient indications that the employer fails to take the required countermeasures and its inaction can be regarded as acceptance.
Relevance in practice: The employer must actively prevent overtime – merely letting it happen is enough for a breach and a works-council injunction claim.
Source: bundesarbeitsgericht.de →